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The Leader as Catalyst 





Individual leaders have been central to the transformation of political institutions, 
organizations and many instances of social and economic reform. Why are some leaders able 
to take advantage of opportunities to successfully catalyze large-scale change while others 
fail? In this paper we argue that the key to understanding a leader’s effectiveness lies in 
dissecting the symbiotic nature of the leader-follower relationship. While the expected 
dynamism of a leader attracts followers, at the same time, followers empower the leader and 
contribute to his dynamism. This two-way leader-follower interaction can endogenously give 
rise to threshold effects: ‘small’ differences in leader ability can have a large impact on the 
degree of effective leadership and dramatically alter the prospects for change. The framework 
also naturally allows us to explore when individuals may deliberately prefer to follow an 
ambitious leader with very different preferences rather than a leader with more congruent 
preferences. Moreover, by empowering the self-interested ambitious leader, such followership 
may make him a more effective agent of (both good and bad) change. 
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For comments and encouragement, thanks to Eli Berman, Tim Besley, Mark Harrison, Ian 
King, Masa Kudamatsu, Stephen Morris, Andrew Oswald, Dani Rodrik and numerous 
seminar participants. “Successful economic policy in developing countries is very far from being the product of pure forces
of history — something that happens when it happens because its time has come. Far from it, in
every case about which I have close knowledge, the policy would in all likelihood have failed (or
never got started) but for the eﬀorts of a key group of individuals, and within that group, one or
two outstanding leaders.
Arnold Harberger (1993), Secrets of Success: A Handful of Heroes
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
On 6 April, 1930, Mahatma Gandhi culminated his “Salt March” in the town of Dandi on the
western coast of India. There, in deﬁance of the British monopoly on the collection of salt, he
simply picked up a lump of natural sea salt. Within days, in a coordinated act of civil disobedience,
not only Gandhi’s followers in the Congress Party, but also millions throughout India did the same.
It is widely agreed that this unique, collective act of non-violent protest was the ﬁr s ts h o tt h a t
eventually brought down the British Empire in India. Gandhi’s skill at recognizing the eﬀectiveness
of civil disobedience and his choice of salt as a simple yet emotive symbol of communication was
important. However, Gandhi’s eﬀectiveness in transforming a novel protest into a broad movement
for change was also driven his ability to draw on a cadre of committed followers that he had
attracted by this time (Dalton, 1993). Indeed, this synergy between a leader and his followers has
been central to most movements of broad-based change. Lenin’s ability to leverage his followers
in the Bolshevik party was crucial in shaping the contours of Soviet political institutions, just
as a group of committed guerillas empowered Fidel Castro to carry out the Cuban revolution.
Similarly, no account of organizational transformation at GE can fail to give Jack Welch and his
‘varsity team’ of followers a central role. Yet, economists have paid relatively little attention to
analyzing the role of leaders in bringing about broad-based institutional or organizational change.1
In this paper we take a step in this direction and ask: why are some leaders adept at seiz-
ing a ‘window of opportunity’ to successfully catalyze large-scale change while others fail? Our
framework emphasizes the key nature of the two-way relationship between a leader and potential
followers in having a dramatic, transformational impact on the prospects for change. However,
such transformational leadership can be for the better or worse — for every leader such as Nelson
Mandela there is a Robert Mugabe. Accordingly, our aim is to also examine within the same struc-
ture the issue of diﬀerent types of leaders, their selection (Besley, 2005) and the type of changes
that are brought about. In particular, we ask if individuals may prefer to become followers of a
1Hermalin (1998) is a prominent exception. In a signaling framework, the paper focuses on how a manager-leader
can motivate a given set of followers to take a particular action.
1leader who is ambitious and unscrupulous or one with whom they have congruent preferences?
Does followership empower or handicap attempts by such leaders at change - be it good or bad?
This paper addresses these questions within a uniﬁed framework of endogenous followership,
leadership and mass participation. In certain domains, by virtue of their formal authority, leaders
are assured that individuals have no choice but to follow the policies announced. However the
exercise of such formal authority through contracts, decrees and diktat is typically much less
relevant in cases of large scale change of the status-quo, be it of institutions, the social order or
the overall economy. While a leader may initiate the process of challenging the status-quo, the
success or failure of such attempted changes depends on how widespread is the popular response
to the leader’s initiative. Participation in successful mass movements for social or political change
is typically voluntary and coordinated — be it the popular overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the
p a r t i c i p a t i o ni nM a r t i nL u t h e rK i n g ’ s“ M a r c ho nW ashington” or the response to Deng Xiaoping’s
“Southern Tour” to resuscitate economic reform. Accordingly, we emphasize that change in the
status-quo occurs only through the voluntary and coordinated switch of actions by a large number
of individuals. Indeed, it is in resolving this mass coordination problem across followers that the
leader plays a crucial role.2 The leader’s dynamism plays an essential part in not only spotting
the right ‘window of opportunity’ for change, but also in communicating it to the population.
However, a leader’s eﬀectiveness in mobilizing participation is not just a function of his ability.
Rather we emphasize that it is best understood by dissecting the two-way relationship between
the leader and his followers. On the one hand good leaders attract a cadre of committed followers.
In turn, having a cadre of committed followers empowers the leader. We show that leaders who
are successful in attracting a core group of committed followers can be particularly eﬀective in
transforming the prospects for change. In part this is because such a group “....can be ordered
out onto the streets at will.... to swell audiences, and campaign for him with extraordinary vigor
and often at sacriﬁce to themselves. A leader can use such followers as a means of subtle or overt
intimidation....He has in short, a most malleable instrument to use at will.”(Willmer, 1984, p.184)
In our model, people choose to (endogenously) become followers by committing to follow more
closely the leader under all circumstances. Doing so is costly and thus individuals will only become
followers if they expect gains from following the leader. This creates a demand for leadership and
(by empowering the leader) in turn aﬀects the supply of leadership by the leader. In equilibrium,
these two forces together determine the probability of successful change. We demonstrate that
this dynamic leader-follower interaction may give rise to endogenous threshold eﬀects for eﬀective
2Evolutionary biologists such as Krause and Ruxton (2002) have emphasized that leadership is likely to have
evolved in humans to solve coordination problems. According to Van Vugt (2006) “leadership originally emerged to
solve simple coordination problems in group-living species and has an ancient phylogenetic history.”
2leadership; only if a combination of the leader’s ability and the underlying structural conditions
satisﬁes a certain threshold, is change possible. Slight diﬀerences in either can lead to dramatic
diﬀerences in the probability of change. Thus even under identical structural conditions, there
may be large diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of leaders of very similar ability. In particular, if the
leader’s ability is higher than the (endogenous) threshold, he attracts a core group of committed
followers which is of suﬃcient size to encourage participation by even non-followers in the process
of change. It thus highlights the critical role that the Bolshevik Party party had in boosting
Lenin’s eﬀectiveness or the Nazi Stormtroopers in transforming Hitler’s political prospects.
Public perceptions of the leader’s ability and the general outlook for the prospects of change
play an important role in determining a leader’s actual eﬀectiveness at catalyzing change. When
these beliefs are pessimistic, change is harder to achieve. Under these conditions, only leaders of
exceptional ability can overcome the (endogenous) threshold to bring about change. By disentan-
gling the eﬀects of public perceptions versus actual leader ability in determining the probability
of successful change, our framework sheds light on the classical debate between the ‘structuralist’
and the ‘Great Man’ schools of historical change.3 We demonstrate that public perceptions deter-
mine the threshold for eﬀective leadership. However, once this threshold is crossed, the leader’s
actual ability helps determine the overall probability of change. Thus, this conforms with what
is popularly known as the “Weberian” view which stresses the importance of individual leader
characteristics, but only under the right structural conditions.
The existence of threshold eﬀects suggests that a leader can have an independent and ﬁrst-
order role in aﬀecting the trajectory of a country’s institutional evolution. Slight diﬀerences in
the quality of leaders of two otherwise similar countries can lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
institutions adopted (or not). Given the importance of institutions for a country’s development4,
this implies that countries need not be trapped by their institutional inheritance. Rather leaders
can serve to transform some institutions — thus institutions need not be destiny.
When the leader’s preferences are not aligned with that of the broader population, eﬀective
leadership is even more diﬃcult. This is because in a divided polity, a leader faces a “credibility
gap”. Individuals fear being misled into making a costly investment and following a leader whose
preferences are not congruent with theirs. However, our framework highlights two additional eﬀects
at work. Self-interested, ambitious leaders can be ruthless, unscrupulous and are likely to leave
3The ‘structural’ view (its earliest proponents were perhaps Tolstoy and Marx; Gilpin (1981) is a more recent
systematic exposition) emphasizes historical forces as determining outcomes, with individuals having a marginal
role. On the other hand, the ‘Great Man’ school (Carlyle (1841) was an early exponent; Kissinger (1968), Ionescu
(1991) are among more recent proponents) views individual leaders as having decisive inﬂuence on outcomes.
4See for example, Acemoglu et. al. (2005), Dixit (2004) and Rodrik et. al. (2005).
3no stone unturned in their drive to identify any ‘window of opportunity’ that helps them achieve
their goals — be it through narrow self-interested change or for a broader gain. The role of this
“ambition eﬀect” in helping bring about change is perhaps best illustrated by Lyndon Johnson’s
role in the U.S. Senate. Once Johnson realized that it would help pave the way to the Presidency,
his ambition and energy was instrumental in ‘discovering’ a solution to the political impasse and
pushing through the Voting Rights Act of 1957. Caro (2002, pp. 862) describes that
.....And now, at last, in 1957, it was.... For at last this leader of men would be leading,
ﬁghting, not only for himself but for a great cause. This man who in the pursuit of his
aims could be so utterly ruthless — who would let nothing stand in his way; who, in
the pursuit, deceived, and betrayed and cheated — would be deceiving and betraying
and cheating on behalf of something other than himself: speciﬁcally, on behalf of the
sixteen million Americans whose skins were dark.
Accordingly, as a by-product of this “ambition eﬀect”, self-interested leaders may also dis-
cover socially beneﬁcial opportunities for change. The eﬀectiveness of an ambitious leader is
further reinforced by an additional eﬀect that we identify in terms of followership for such leaders.
Self-interested ambitious leaders will typically catalyze change that is personally beneﬁcial, quite
irrespective of whether or not it adversely aﬀects the wider populace. This gives an individual a
further incentive to become a follower in order to insulate oneself against adverse changes.5 This
“insulation” eﬀect reinforces the “ambition” eﬀect and makes the self-interested leader a more
eﬀective agent for change. However, given that such leaders lack credibility and cannot be trusted
to always bring about socially beneﬁcial change, it is a priori not clear that a majority of the
populace will select such a leader. Quite strikingly, we show that under certain circumstances an
ambitious leader with preferences diﬀering from the majority maybe preferred to a leader whose
preferences are congruent. While the overall probability of change is higher under an ambitious,
self-interested leader, such change may be for better or for worse.
Related Literature: Leadership plays an important role in all forms of human (and primate (Brown,
1991 and Wilson, 1975)) societies. Indeed despite being poorly understood (see Burns, 1978 for
an overview), leadership has been relatively understudied by economists. An important early
contribution is Hermalin (1998) who in a signaling framework, emphasizes the importance of a
leader’s example in getting a given team of individuals to follow. While his model captures well
the leader’s initiative in the overall process, it does not consider the decision of individuals to
endogenously invest in followership and thereby empower the leader. In our model, this two-way
5Brustein (1996) and Kravchenko (1947) document how prudent self-insurance was one of the factors driving
individuals to become members of the Nazi (or Communist) party when Hitler (respectively, Stalin) came to power.
4interaction is crucial in determining the eﬀectiveness of a given leader. Rotemberg and Saloner
(1993) capture leadership by analyzing how the degree of empathy a leader has for the subordinate
can alter the latter’s incentives. However, they do not consider the role of followership and its
feedback onto the leader’s dynamism and on other agents. While Besley and Ghatak (2005) do
not directly address the issue of leadership, their analysis of motivated agents shares some aspects
of the leader-follower relationship studied here. We instead focus on the incentive of potential
followers to make themselves more or less ‘motivated’, and its eﬀect on the leader. Aghion and
Tirole (1997) highlight the impact on incentives of the decision by a principal with formal authority
to delegate real authority to a subordinate. Our framework instead emphasizes the importance of
(subordinates’) followership in transforming the leader’s formal authority to initiate change into
eﬀective leadership (i.e. into real authority).
The literature on institutional change has recognized the importance of leaders in determining
the trajectory of a country. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) acknowledge
the role of Seretse Khama in laying the foundations of growth in Botswana. Jones and Olken (2005,
2006) are the ﬁrst to empirically demonstrate using a cross-country study, that leaders matter for
growth and institutional change. Recent work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) on political
transitions has been very inﬂuential. Their work emphasizes the role that lack of commitment
and exogenous shocks play in aﬀecting the ruling elites’ cost-beneﬁt calculus of persisting with
the status-quo political set-up. Our framework can be viewed as providing a micro foundation for
the process of how such stochastic shocks get translated into political change. In our framework,
coordination is not automatic but occurs as a result of the leader’s ability in recognizing a window of
opportunity and convincing the populace of the beneﬁts from seizing it. It highlights that although
opportunities for change may come about, not all societies are able to capitalize on them. Some,
especially those with a low quality of leaders may remain trapped by their institutional inheritance.
The study of leadership and change has been pursued in much greater detail in disciplines
other than economics. For instance, the study of leadership is a central theme in many studies of
organization behavior and management (see Bass, 1990 and Northouse, 2004). Similarly, it has
been explored in political science (Burns, 1978), international relations (Young, 1991) and social
psychology (Van Vugt and De Cremer, 1999), among other ﬁelds.
We start by describing the elements of the basic model in the next section. In Section 3.1 we
analyze the equilibrium when the preferences of the leader and the populace are congruent. We
relax this assumption in Section 3.2 with the leader-follower preferences being not perfectly aligned.
Some applications are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 details some particular instances of
leadership and change. Section 6 concludes.
52 The Model
We develop a simple model to capture the two-way relationship between followers and a leader
and the impact of this relationship on successfully engendering change. The model consists of the
following key elements. One, the mechanism for successful change which requires the coordinated
switch of actions by a large number of individuals under the right circumstances; two, the leader’s
role in identifying suitable opportunities for change and spurring individuals to take advantage
of such opportunities; three, followership, which is characterized by the willingness of individuals
to respond to a leader’s call for action. A key aspect of our framework is the interdependence
between the followers’ demand for leadership and the leader’s supply of leadership, which together
help determine the probability of successful change.
Uncertainty and Coordination:
While many changes such as an alteration of the tax rate or the wage, can be unilaterally imple-
mented by a leader or manager through ﬁat, broad-based economic, institutional, organizational
or social change is far more diﬃcult to achieve. Such change often requires a coordinated switch
in the beliefs and actions of a large number of individuals with possibly diﬀering preferences, costs
and priors, and is typically diﬃcult to achieve. Not only does an individual agent lack informa-
tion about whether others also plan to switch, but further may even be uncertain if underlying
conditions are such that change is optimal to begin with.
To capture uncertainty about whether or not the underlying conditions are appropriate for
change, we assume that there are three possible states of nature: B,G0 and G1.S t a t eB is one
in which change is never possible; in this state, even a coordinated change of actions will not
only never succeed, but also results in all participants (including the leader) becoming worse oﬀ,
earning a very large negative utility. This is meant to capture the idea that under some conditions,
any attempt at change is futile and costly and should not be undertaken.6 The prior on the states
being B,G0 and G1 are 1 − α,α(1 − a) and αa respectively.
In states G0 and G1, change is possible but requires coordinated mass action. We assume that
the probability of successful change in either of these states is given by 1
θp.mθ,w h e r em is the
fraction of the populace participating in the process, θ>0, and p ∈ (0,1) is a parameter that
denotes the degree of uncertainty inherent in the process. This formulation captures in a stylized
manner two plausible aspects of the process of regime change – one, that it is stochastic and
two, it is more likely to occur when there are more active participants. The parameter θ captures
the impact of the degree of complementarity amongst participants on the probability of success;
6In eﬀect, this assumption rules out the possibility of a ‘sunspot’ as a spontaneous coordination device.
6when θ is small, the marginal eﬀect of increased participation m is large. For simplicity, in most
o ft h ea n a l y s i st h a tf o l l o w s ,w ea s s u m eθ =1and thus the probability of successful change equals
p.m. In section 3.1.1, we relax this assumption and examine the implications of diﬀerences in the
degree of complementarity θ on the qualitative results.
While change is possible in both states G0 and G1,t h e yd i ﬀer in terms of the distributional
consequences of successful change. The population is assumed to belong to one of two groups —
the majority (group M) or the minority elite (group E). State G1 is a situation in which the gains
from successful change are wide-spread and accrue to any individual who is an active participant
in the process, irrespective of his or her group. In this state, we denote by G>0 the gain from
successful change to a participant from either group; for non-participants, this is zero. Such gains
could be psychological, arising for instance from the satisfaction of participating in the overthrow
of a hated autocrat, or the status rewards from being a “freedom ﬁghter” or a party oﬃcial.
Equivalently the rewards may be material, in the form of preferential access to scarce resources
accruing to members of a successful political party or revolutionary group, or being the early
adopter of a successful technology.7 In contrast, in state G0, the gains from change accrue to a
much narrower segment of the population, namely, only to participants from the elite group E.8
In this state, while participants from the majority group incur the cost and raise the chances of
success, they enjoy none of the gains from change. Accordingly, popular perception of the leader’s
interests being aligned with one group or the other has important consequences for his credibility
(and hence the degree of followership). For simplicity, we assume that the minority group is of
zero mass (while the majority is of mass 1). We will discuss below how relaxing this assumption
does not qualitatively aﬀect most of our results (footnote 26 characterizes the equilibrium in the
case of a small but non-zero mass of group E).
We have normalized the payoﬀ from maintaining the status-quo as 0, and have also taken the
gains to non-participants from successful change as being 0. This is largely to reduce unnecessary
notation. The analysis would not change if instead we denoted the gains to non-participants from
successful change by say ∆, and G as the additional gains enjoyed by participants in the process
of change that is over and above ∆.
While change is possible in some states and not in others, at an individual level what makes
it particularly diﬃcult is the lack of information about the underlying state of the world. Indeed,
7Ferguson and Voth (2008) document that ﬁrms that had ‘close and early connections’ with the Nazi Party in
Germany during the thirties, reaped large ﬁnancial rewards. Such early ‘follower’ ﬁrms outperformed the stock
market to the tune of 5 to 8 percent.
8Alternately, it could also be interpreted as a state in which the gains from change accrue only to the leader (e.g.
consolidation of political power), while the population gain nothing. For example, state G0 could require a process
of change that involved a large scale destruction of resources that is unlikely to be of beneﬁtt ot h em a j o r i t y .
7in the absence of information, the large downside risk if the underlying state turns out to be B
results in a lack of action and thus the persistence of institutions and the prevalence of the status
quo. This is where we introduce a role for a leader.
Leadership and Information:
While the general populace lacks information about the underlying state of the world, we assume
that there is an exogenously given leader who is in a position to invest in acquiring such information
and conveying it to the masses. For instance, in the case of political change, it could be information
that the ruling regime is currently weak and vulnerable, or in the instance of economic reform,
it could be about the state of the global market. However, ascertaining whether there exists a
suitable ‘window of opportunity’ is not easy for the leader to do (Hirshman, 1970).9 It requires
a mixture of skill and instincts as well as initiative as exempliﬁed in Lyndon Johnson’s ability to
spot and utilize a unique ‘window of opportunity’ to push through the Voting Rights Act of 1957
or Lenin’s perfect timing in his decision to launch the October Revolution. Accordingly we assume
that if the leader expends resources e(i)=li2/2, then with probability i he learns perfectly the
state of nature, while with probability 1−i, he learns nothing. On learning of a right opportunity,
the leader next needs to convey this information to the populace. To capture the leader’s ability
at communication, we denote by τ ∈ (0,1) the probability that any member of the population
receives the leader’s message. The population is assumed to be a continuum so that equivalently
τ is also the fraction that receives the leader’s message. Thus the two parameters l and τ capture
two aspects of the leader’s ability: his dexterity at identifying the right opportunities (a smaller
l), and his skill at eﬀectively communicating with the populace (a higher τ).
While the model here focuses on the leader’s decision to expend eﬀort in acquiring information
about the underlying state, we can easily use it to analyze other activities of the leader too, such
as the intensity of his communication and persuasion of others to invest in change. For instance,
one could alternately formulate (with similar qualitative results) the leader’s choice variable as the
amount of eﬀort spent at communicating information, with i being the fraction of the populace
that receives his message if he expends resources e(i).
A second aspect of the model also deserves comment. Our framework allows us to distinguish
between a leader’s formal authority and leadership, the probability that the leader is likely to
bring about change. While the leader here is one by virtue of his position i.e. is the only one
9Indeed, Hirshman (1970) argues that it is an essential aspect of leadership. For instance, when discussing the
example of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, Colombia’s ‘reform-mongering’ President in the sixties, he argues that good
leaders have “the ability to perceive change when most of one’s contemporaries are still unable to do so.... that
would enable a leader to take advantage of new opportunities as soon as they arise.”
8in a position to acquire and communicate information, this formal authority in and of itself does
not translate into catalyzing change. Instead eﬀective leadership is a function of not just good
information and the underlying structural conditions, but crucially also dependent on individuals’
willingness to respond to the leader in challenging the status-quo. As we show below, even under
suitable circumstances, only certain leaders will exhibit eﬀective leadership in the sense of being
able to successfully catalyze change.
To capture the leader’s incentives in the simplest manner, we denote by Ls the leader’s payoﬀ
from successful change in state Gs,s∈ {0,1}. This payoﬀ could be either a monetary or political
gain as a result of successful change. The following restriction on gains Ls and costs l ensures
that the choice variable i (which is the probability that the leader acquires information about the
present state) is always less than 1.
Assumption 1: αpτLs <l
Given that there are two groups in the economy, the majority M and minority elite E,t h e
leader’s interests could be aligned with either group. Notice that the above formulation allows us
to easily capture such diﬀerences in preferences. A “benevolent” or “non-partisan” leader here is
one who cares about the welfare of the majority and thus would like to see change coming about
only in state G1 where the beneﬁts are wide-spread and accrue to all groups. Thus for such a leader
we assume that L1 > 0 and L0 =0 . On the other hand, a leader may have preferences aligned
with the narrow elite or could be self-interested in the sense of pursuing modes of change that
beneﬁt only himself. Such a “self-interested” or “elitist” leader would like to see change enacted
even in state G0, where only the elite (and himself) gain while all bear the cost. Accordingly, such
a leader is assumed to have L1 > 0 and L0 > 0. In our analysis below, we will in turn consider
each of these two types of leaders.
Since successful change requires coordinated participation in the process by a large number of
individuals, we now describe the costs and beneﬁts from participation.
Participation and followership:
There exists a unit mass of individuals, some of whom may choose to participate in the process
of changing the status-quo. While participation holds the promise of a reward (as described
before), it also involves incurring some costs. The degree of an individual’s response to a call for
action by the leader will obviously depend on her cost of participation as well as the perceived
beneﬁts. A natural way to introduce followership in our framework is to assume that individuals
can ex-ante invest in lowering their ex-post cost of participation. Individuals who make this early
investment are more likely to have a lower participation cost in the future and are thus more
likely to participate when called upon to do so by the leader. In other words, such individuals are
9“followers”.10 I nt e r m so ft h em o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a tw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yy, the personal cost c of
participating in the process is 0, a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − y, this cost c is drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [0,c H]. We will assume that cH is high enough so that not all people
participate in the process of change even in the best possible circumstances:
Assumption 2: pτG < cH
Depending on the context, these participation costs can take diﬀerent forms. For instance, an
attempt to bring about a revolution against an autocratic government requires individuals to take
costly actions in the form of participation in street protests, boycotts, and even armed struggle.
Such acts involve the possibility of arrest and physical harm and also direct costs in terms of
opportunities foregone. In this case, undergoing arms or ideological training before-hand, joining
a political party, organizing one’s matters and forsaking other forms of employment, reduce the
ex-post cost of participation and make one more likely to participate in the revolution if and
when it comes about. Alternatively, a country’s attempt at liberalizing the economy or joining
the WTO is likely to be successful if domestic ﬁrms have already made the costly investment to
modernize and increase productivity. Given any convexity in adjustment costs, ﬁrms that upgrade
their technology early instead of waiting till the end moment, are likely to have lower adjustment
costs, and consequently a higher overall payoﬀ.
Accordingly in the model we assume that people can invest before-hand in y i.e. in lowering
their ex-post cost of participation. The cost of investing y is given by f(y)=ky2/2. This formu-
lation provides us with a simple way to distinguish between followers and other participants. We
label as “followers” those individuals with a low cost c =0of participation in any change, as they
participate whenever called upon to do so by the leader. On the other hand, individuals with costs
drawn between 0 and cH decide whether or not to participate depending on their own realized
costs as well as their expectations of the movement succeeding – these are the “non-followers”.
While a fraction of this group may participate in the process, their decision to follow the leader’s
call for action is not automatic and is contingent on other factors.11
Dramatic institutional change such as the onset of democracy, the extension of civil rights or
revolution of any kind typically involves numerous participants. This distinction between “fol-
lowers” and the “non-follower” participants is a simple way to emphasize the diﬀerences between
diﬀerent kinds of participants that is common in many social and political movements for change.
10All that is required is that the (expected) payoﬀ is higher, the earlier an individual makes a commitment. This
payoﬀ can be either pecuniary or even non-pecuniary in the form of more status and authority post-regime change.
11While the followers here are modeled as those with (endogenously) lower participation costs c, they could also
be thought of as those who have psychologically adopted the leader’s ideology or invested in learning his “language”






























Figure 1: Timing of events
The followers can be considered to be the committed and loyal supporters who oﬀer unconditional
support to the leader and play a pivotal role in spurring the leader towards action.12 Depending on
the kind of change being analyzed, these followers can be members of Mandela’s African National
Congress, Lenin’s Bolshevik Party or Jack Welch’s ‘varsity team’ of managers.
Timing of events. Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic depiction of the timing of events. Initially, at
date T =0 , each member of the population decides how much y to invest in reducing his or
her cost of participation. A higher y at this stage denotes a greater degree of followership, as
one is then more likely to respond positively to the leader’s call for participation ex-post. The
state of the world is subsequently realized, and at date T =1the leader invests i in acquiring
information about it. If he receives information, the leader communicates this to the populace.
People’s personal costs of participation are then realized, and at T =2 , each decides whether or
not to participate in the process of bringing about change. Depending on the state of the world
and the number of people participating, change occurs or not and payoﬀs are realized.
3 Leadership and Change: Equilibrium Analysis
As pointed out earlier, the framework described above seeks to capture the dynamic between
a leader and his followers and its overall consequences for large scale change such as economic
reform, institutional and organizational transformation. In determining the leader’s eﬀectiveness
at catalyzing change, one has to account for not just his ability but also his preferences. As
described above, depending on the value of L0, the leader may have objectives aligned with the
12Hitler saw the advantage of such a fanatical band of followers and recognized the power of his Nazi party as
early as 1921. When talking about the Storm troopers, Hitler said “the young movement was to supply what the
others lacked: a volkisch movement with a strictly public base, including the broadest masses, welded together by
iron-hard organization, ﬁlled with blind obedience and inspired with brutal determination, a party of battle and
action.” For instance, Hitler’s Storm troopers could be either encouraged or “restrain(ed) from action or violence if
it seemed advantageous.” (Willmer, 1984, pp. 184).
11majority or with the minority elite, and this may impact individual participation and followership
decisions. In our analysis below, we consider each case separately.
3.1 Leadership and Followership under Congruent Preferences
We begin by exploring the leader-follower dynamic in the case where there is perfect alignment of
preferences between the leader and the majority i.e. the case of a non-partisan or benevolent leader.
Such congruence could arise either because the leader belongs to group M and/or is non-partisan
by nature or because underlying political considerations force the leader to only take into account
the welfare of the majority. For example, if the political framework is one where the majority
M has the power to determine whether or not the leader is re-selected, we can expect a closer
congruence in the objectives of the leader with those of group M. To not introduce additional
issues of imperfect information, we assume the leader’s preferences are common knowledge. Note
that in this case, both the leader and potential participants only gain in state G1; thus issues of
the leader misleading or signaling by example (as in Hermalin, 1998) do not arise here.
Participation: In analyzing the equilibrium, let us start from period T =2where each individual
knows his own opportunity cost of participation c and decides whether or not to participate. For
an individual who has not received any message from the leader, given that there is a very large
negative utility to attacking in a bad state, he will not participate irrespective of his cost.
Thus the only consideration is for individuals who have received message of a good state from
the leader. Since the leader here is a benevolent one, all such individuals will infer that the state
must be G1 as a benevolent leader will never issue a call for action in states B or G0. If this
individual faces zero cost of participation, as is the case for a committed follower, he will indeed
participate. For an individual with a positive cost c, he will have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts
from participation in making his decision. If his expectation about how many other people will
participate is me, this individual will also choose to participate only if c ≤ pGme. Thus the
marginal participant is one whose participation cost is given by c∗ = pGme.
Given the leader’s ability τ at communicating his message, a fraction τ of the populace receives
it. Of this, a fraction y are committed followers and have zero realized cost of participation and
surely do so; among the rest, only those with costs less than c∗ participate. Thus aggregating
across all individuals, the total mass of people who participate in the process is given by:




In equilibrium, individual expectations about aggregate participation are realized. Thus, incor-
porating this into the marginal participation decision gives the equilibrium cut-oﬀ cost c∗ for
12participation:




For a given level of followership y>0, this equation gives the degree of participation c∗ by
non-followers, and is represented by the increasing curve P in ﬁgure 2(a) — the participation curve.
The following proposition shows that c∗ is unique and analyzes some of its properties.
Proposition 1 For any given level of followership y>0, there is a unique level of participation
c∗, which is determined from equation (1). Increases in y, τ, p or G or a decrease in cH raise the
probability of change in state G1.
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in the number of followers y or better communication ability of the leader τ or a
decrease in cH raise the mass of participants for a given c∗, thus raising the chances of success.
This encourages more marginal participants thereby raising c∗. As the overall probability of change
is related to the total mass of participants in the process, variations in the underlying parameters
that raise c∗ also serve to increase the probability of successful change. For instance, in the
presence of a leader who is perceived to be an eﬀective communicator, each individual expects the
leader’s message to reach more people. Thus each is more encouraged to participate and hence
overall there is greater participation (and a higher chance of success) in bringing about change.
It is interesting to note some additional features of this solution. As y increases, c∗ increases.
In other words, as the number of committed followers increase, so too does participation by the
rest of the population. Thus there is complementarity between followers and mass participation.
Note also that when y =0 , the only equilibrium involves c∗ =0i.e. no possibility of change13.
Thus a core group of committed followers is necessary to have any positive chance of successful
change. The nature of this dynamic between an individual’s followership decision and leadership
will become more evident in our analysis of the overall equilibrium below.
Leadership:N e x tw em o v eb a c kt op e r i o dT =1where the leader decides on how much eﬀort i to
devote in trying to discover the underlying state. If the benevolent leader uncovers no information
or discovers that the conditions are not right (i.e. in states G0 or B), he will not send out any
message urging people to participate as there is zero probability of success. On the other hand
if the underlying state is good (i.e. G1), the leader issues a call to initiate change. Of course,
whether or not people will act on the leader’s message depends on their own personal costs as well
as their expectation about action by others (as described above).
13This is because under Assumption 2, the equilibrium condition pτG
c∗
cH = c
∗ cannot hold for any c
∗ ∈ (0,c H].
13Taking the participation decision of the populace in response to a call for action as given, the
leader chooses his eﬀort i at discovering the underlying state to maximize αaipmeL1 − e(i). The
ﬁrst-order condition for the problem yields the leader’s degree of initiative:
αapmeL1 = αapτ[y +( 1− y)
c∗
cH
]L1 = li (2)
As the leader expects a greater degree of response me by the populace to his message, it encourages
him to expend more resources into discovering suitable windows of opportunity. In other words,
the supply of the leader’s initiative is increasing in the number of committed followers y as well as
the expected participation of the “non-followers” in the general populace (given by c∗).I ti sa l s o
increasing in the rewards from change, either for himself (a higher L1) or for the participants (via
an increase in c∗) or an increase in his communication-ability (τ).T h ee ﬀect of τ on the leader’s
incentives can be both direct as well as indirect. First, the marginal rewards from increasing eﬀort
at discovering the underlying state is larger for a leader who can reach a bigger audience — the
direct eﬀect. This is reinforced by an indirect eﬀect — namely, expectations of a larger fraction of
the population receiving the leader’s message encourages increased participation by non-followers
(i.e. a higher c∗), which again feeds back to the leader investing more in i.
Followership: Finally, we move back to the initial period T =0to analyze the decision by
individuals to invest resources y in becoming followers. Recall that a higher y lowers the expected
cost of participation in the future, and thus by investing in y, people commit themselves to more
closely following the leader when called upon to do so. Of course, this decision to invest in
followership depends on the expectations about the outcomes to follow in the subsequent periods.
To compute the expected payoﬀ from investing y, note that in period T =2 , an individual
participates in the process of change only if the leader’s message is received (which occurs only if
the leader uncovers the state G1) and if her cost of participation is either 0 or below c∗. Investing in
followership (a higher y) helps lower the expected participation cost in the future. With probability
y, this cost is 0, while with probability 1 − y it is distributed between 0 and cH. Denoting by V
the expected gains from participating, an individual’s payoﬀ from investing y is thus:


















14The above equation (4) gives the level of individual investment in followership y for a given
level of participation c∗ and leadership eﬀort i. We label this the followership curve and it is
represented by the curve F in ﬁgure 2(a). In the above relationship, note that for any given level
of participation c∗, t h ed e g r e eo ff o l l o w e r s h i py is increasing in the level of initiative ie that is
expected from the leader. As analyzed in equation (2), the feedback is in fact two way; a higher
level of followership y has a positive eﬀect on the resources i that is put forth by the leader also.
Furthermore, an increased number of committed followers encourages participation by the rest of
the populace, raising c∗. However, as the above equation shows, there is a reverse eﬀect too: as c∗
increases i.e. as general participation rises (thereby increasing the chances of success), it enhances
the incentives for any individual to become a committed follower.
While the above three individual decisions of participation, followership and the leader’s ini-
tiative satisfy intuitively simple comparative statics properties, our objective is to focus on the
interaction between the three decisions and how that translates into the overall prospects for
successful change. This is what we do next.
Overall equilibrium: In this game, there always exists a no-action status-quo equilibrium in
which no one invests in y i.e. everyone chooses y =0 , following which (from (1)) c∗ =0i.e. no
one participates, and i =0 . Anticipating this, the choice of y =0at the initial stage is a rational
response. In this equilibrium, there is no probability of change and the status-quo is retained.
To investigate interior equilibria, one needs to combine the ex-ante followership decisions of
individuals with the leader’s initiative decision in period T =1and the participation decision of
non-followers in period T =2 . While the Appendix contains the details, here we outline the steps
required to obtain the overall equilibrium. Recall that equation (1) (curve P in Figure 2(a)) gives
the degree of participation c∗ by non-followers for a given level of followership y, and that equation
(4) (curve F in Figure 2(a)) provides the degree of investment in followership y for a given level
of participation c∗ and leadership eﬀort i. Together, these two relationships pin down the overall
















Solution(s) to this equation (if any) determine equilibria for the overall game. Clearly one possible
equilibrium involves c∗ =0 . Here no one becomes a follower, the leader expends no eﬀort and
overall there is zero probability of change. However, there can be interior equilibria too.
Thus if the situation is as in case 1 of the ﬁgure, the only intersection is at c∗ =0and the only
equilibrium for the game involves no change. On the other hand, in case 2, there are two interior












Figure 2: Overall equilibrium
case, one needs to take into account the relative speed of change of the two curves; equation (5)
incorporates this. Eliminating a c∗ from both sides of the equation, the left-hand side is inverse
U-shaped in c∗, as depicted in ﬁgure 2(b), while the right hand side is a constant. Thus, depending
on whether the right hand side lies above or below the highest point of the inverse U, there is













then the only equilibrium for the overall game is where no one becomes a follower i.e. y =0 , and
i =0and there is no possibility of change. On the other hand, if this condition does not hold,
then there are two interior equilibria in addition to the no action equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition demonstrates that the overall equilibrium to the game can be of two
kinds. First, there always exists a degenerate status-quo equilibrium where there is no possibility
of regime change. Under some circumstances, it is the only equilibrium. As condition (6) shows,
this will be the case when the general prior α about the prospects for change is highly pessimistic,
or the leader is of poor quality in terms of his ability at gathering information or communicating
it, or when the perceived gains from change G are relatively low. In all other circumstances,
the above proposition points out the possibility of multiple interior equilibria. One is a high
probability-of-change equilibrium involving a high level of followership y, ah i g hd e g r e eo fe ﬀort
by the leader i, and overall a good amount of participation. At the same time, there also exists a
low-level equilibrium with few becoming committed followers as well as less eﬀort by the leader;
in this case there is a relatively low (but non-zero) possibility of change.
16The multiple interior equilibria is the result of the interaction between the leader, the followers
and the non-followers. As more people invest in becoming followers, thus committing themselves
to taking action whenever called upon to do so by the leader, it increases incentives for the leader
as well as increases participation by non-followers. Knowing that more people will act upon getting
his message, the leader puts in more initiative at discovering the right conditions for change, thus
raising the ex-ante chances of success. This encourages more people to invest in followership in
the ﬁrst place. It is the two-way feedback between followership, leadership and participation that
thus leads to one equilibrium involving a high degree of all three and another with low degrees of
all. Among the three equilibria (in case 2), the status quo equilibrium and the equilibrium with
the highest level of c∗ are stable, while the middle one involving moderate levels of followership,
participation and change is unstable.14 What are the implications of this proposition for leadership
and how robust is the result? This is what we discuss next.
3.1.1 Leadership, Change and Endogenous Threshold Eﬀects
A key implication of the above proposition is that it demonstrates the possibility of endogenous
threshold eﬀects for eﬀective leadership. When condition (6) is not satisﬁed, no movement for
change gets oﬀ the ground and there is no possibility of change. This is further illustrated in
Figure 3(a):15,16 here, if the leader’s ability is below an endogenous threshold (i.e. if τ or 1/l is
small enough), the probability of catalyzing change is zero. Above this threshold, the prospects for
change increase discontinuously. This discontinuity is quite striking, given that all the underlying
variables are continuous. It suggests that even though the leader here is exogenously given in the
sense of being in a position to acquire and distribute pertinent information, not all leaders are able
to get started a movement for change. Thus a distinction between leaders and eﬀective leadership,
the positive probability of bringing about change, emerges endogenously here. Looking at condition
(6), change requires not only a leader of high enough ability, but also a combination of the right
underlying conditions in the sense of an optimistic general outlook about the possibility and gains
from change. Thus the view of leadership that emerges here conforms with what is popularly
14This can be seen from ﬁgure 2(a). At the middle equilibrium, consider a slight increase in y.F r o m(P), this
translates into an increase in participation c
∗, which feeds back into increased followership y through the followership
curve (F). The resulting feedback is in fact greater than the initial increase in y, implying that the overall dynamics
move away from this equilibrium. On the other hand, it is the opposite case for the status quo equilibrium and the
equilibrium with the highest level of c
∗ i.e. these two are stable.
15The ﬁgure is drawn under the assumption that the Pareto-dominant (and stable) equilibrium prevails i.e. the
one with the highest c
∗.














Figure 3: Eﬀect on the probability of successful change
known as the “Weberian” view which stresses the importance of individual leader characteristics,
but only under the right structural conditions. Figure 3(b) further highlights this interaction
between the leader’s ability l and the public prior α in determining the chances for change. When
the general outlook α is very optimistic, even leaders of low ability are able to catalyze change;
on the other hand, in pessimistic times, the threshold ability level for eﬀective leadership is much
higher.
The mechanics underlying the threshold eﬀects can be understood by looking at Figure 2(a).
Consider the impact of a change in the leader’s ability variable l.T h i sh a sn oe ﬀect on the P-curve
since it represents the participation decision of non-followers which takes place after uncovering
of the state by the leader. On the other hand, the F-curve represents ex-ante investment in
followership. A lowering of l implies increased initiative i by the leader for any given level of
participation c∗, and thereby encourages increased followership y. In other words, the F-curve
shifts upward with a decrease in l, thus making (intersection and) interior equilibria more likely.
To see the intuition, we begin by observing that in the absence of a leader there is a coordi-
nation failure. By providing information, the leader helps resolve this coordination failure, but
his eﬀectiveness depends on the degree of underlying strategic complementarities. There are two
channels through which strategic complementarities work in the model. First, is the complemen-
tarity that arises between followers and the participation decisions of non-followers. Second, the
complementarity between the leader’s ability and individual investment in followership. Accord-
ingly, a leader of higher ability makes each individual’s participation decision less dependent on the
decisions of others - mitigating the coordination problem. Therefore, an increase in the leader’s
ability increases the size of committed followership. Moreover, this direct eﬀect of a larger set of
core followers further encourages participation by the non-followers. Together these two eﬀects
result in the leader’s ability having a disproportionate impact on the probability of change.
18MacGregor Burns (1978) raised the diﬃculty in conceptually distinguishing between leadership
and the leader’s ability. The threshold eﬀect result here suggests that the relationship between
the two is highly non-linear and dependent on underlying conditions. A leader with ability even
marginally below the threshold displays no leadership as compared to a leader with ability above
the threshold.
3.1.2 What Makes a Leader Eﬀective? Perceptions or Reality
Is the leader’s eﬀectiveness at transforming the status-quo a function of public perceptions or
actual leader ability? Addressing this issue helps throw some light on the long-standing debate
in leadership of whether change is driven by actual leader ability (the ‘Great Man theory’) or
whether the underlying ‘spirit of the times’ was ripe for change. In addressing these questions we
also examine the robustness of our results to allowing for a dispersion in beliefs in the population
about underlying parameters, such as the leader’s ability l or the prospects for change, α.17
In the model so far, we have assumed that all individuals share the same belief α about the
possibility for change, about the congruence parameter a and are perfectly aware of the leader’s
ability l. It can be argued that in reality individuals may diﬀer in their perceptions about any
or all of these parameters. As emphasized by Morris and Shin (2003) and others, it is more
than likely that there is a heterogeneity in beliefs about underlying parameters. For instance,
some individuals may be more optimistic than others about the leader’s ability or the underlying
conditions. Accordingly, in what follows we capture a possible heterogeneity in beliefs by focusing
on dispersed perceptions about the leader’s ability.
In particular, suppose the leader’s ability l is not known, but is commonly believed that
this ability parameter is given by a random variable e l which is distributed over the interval [l,l]
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ec d fF(e l), where l>l>α p τ L s. Equivalently, one could assume that there is a
dispersion in beliefs about the leader’s ability, with F(e l) being the fraction of the population who
believe the leader’s ability to be below e l. The rest of the game is the same as before.
Uncertainty about l does not aﬀect the participation decision in the second period, as this
decision is taken after the discovery of the state by the leader. Thus equation (1) still characterizes
17Our framework shares many features common to coordination games (e.g. Morris and Shin 2003). However,
there are also important diﬀerences. First, our framework endogenizes the degree of complementarity by allowing
individuals to invest in becoming “followers” prior to the leader’s public signal. Second, the leader here is not a
passive recepient of information that he makes public. Rather, he actively invests eﬀort and resources in seeking
and ‘discovering’ appropriate conditions for an attack on the status-quo. Together, these imply that for example, if
a leader has no committed followers, then the public signal is ineﬀective in coordinating actions. On the ﬂipside, if
a leader has no committed followers, then he will not invest in change to begin with.
19participation of non-followers. Moving back to T =1 , the eﬀort decision e i for a leader of ability
e l depends on the expected mass of participants me in period T =2 , and is given by a condition
analogous to (2): e i = αapmeL1/e l.
At the initial period T =0 , the followership decision of an individual is related to the expected
eﬀort that will be put in by the leader E(e i) and is given by18: y = αaτE(e i)[c∗ −
(c∗)2
2cH ]/k, which
is analogous to equation (4). As before, incorporating e i from the leader’s decision and y from the



















This is almost identical to equation (5) before, and therefore as in proposition 2, the condition for














Now observe that in the above condition, the leader’s actual ability l does not enter this inequality.
This has a striking implication, in that it suggests that the threshold for eﬀective leadership
depends solely on the public perception about the leader’s ability E(1/e l).I no t h e rw o r d s ,i nt h e
absence of a good reputation, even a high ability leader will be quite ineﬀective. However, once the
threshold is crossed, the leader’s actual ability plays a positive role in determining the prospect of
change. In terms of ﬁgure 3(a), an increase in the leader’s actual ability raises the non-zero part of
the graph, but has no eﬀect on the threshold at which the probability of change jumps discretely
up. Therefore, our analysis suggests that a society’s perceptions of a leader’s ability are important
because they inﬂuence the decision to become a follower. Gandhi’s reputation (acquired in South
Africa) was crucial in helping generate a cadre of committed followers when he arrived in India in
1915 and made him immediately eﬀective.
Similarly, a dispersion in beliefs about the prospects for change, α, can also be accommodated
into the structure of the basic model. While individual beliefs e α aﬀect followership decisions, the

















where E(e α) is the mean of the beliefs in the population. Again, as in proposition 2, if either
αL or E(e α) is too small, then the only equilibrium involves persistence of the status quo. This
18In the case of dispersed beliefs, investment in followership by an individual who believes that the leader’s ability
is h l is given by: h y = αaτh i[c
∗ −
(c∗)2
2cH ]/k. Now, integrating over the whole population, the total mass of followers is




20result has interesting implications. It suggests that the prevailing zeitgeist directly impinges on
the prospects of change. If expectations for change were suﬃciently optimistic, even a leader of
relatively modest talents can bring about revolution. For instance, Lenin’s return to Petrograd
in April 1917 was so eﬀective, because the prospects for a successful revolution were believed to
be high. This is not to deny the possibility that Lenin was a leader of high ability and his role
in the October Revolution was key (see Service, 2000 for a discussion). Rather it is to emphasize
that most cases of change occur due to some combination of the expectations about underlying
prospects of change and the leader’s reputation. Indeed it is precisely this possibility that has
perhaps contributed to the diverse viewpoints among social scientists regarding the importance of
the leader’s inherent ability versus the underlying public belief in contributing to change.
We summarize the above argument that both expectations as well as fundamentals matter for
t h ee x e r c i s eo fe ﬀective leadership in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The population’s perception of the leader’s ability E(1/e l) or of the prospects for
change E(e α) determines the threshold for eﬀective leadership where there is a positive probability
of change. However, once this threshold is crossed, the leader’s actual ability helps determine the
overall probability of change.
3.1.3 Leadership and Threshold Eﬀects: the Role of Complementarity
How does the degree of complementarity in individual participation decisions matter for the equi-
librium and therefore for the overall probability of successful change? In addressing this question
we revert to the general formulation, where the probability of change is given by 1
θpmθ,w i t h
θ>0. Recall that the parameter θ now captures the degree of complementarity in the process, as
as m a l l e rθ corresponds to a higher marginal product of increased participation m. The structure
of the game is the same as before except that (similar to Assumption 2), we now assume:
Assumption 20: pτG < θcH
The analysis of the participation decision, the degree of leadership eﬀort exerted and the in-
vestment into followership is very similar to that above and are derived in the Appendix. Together,























Clearly c∗ =0(i.e. one where no one becomes a follower, the leader expends no eﬀort and overall
there is zero probability of change), is an equilibrium now too. Looking for interior equilibria, the
left hand side of (7) is the same as that of (5). However the right-hand side is now diﬀerent and
21the interior equilibria in some cases will now be unique and may involve no threshold requirements
for leaders to be eﬀective. The following Corollary to Proposition 2 analyzes this in more detail.
Corollary 1 For θ<1, in addition to the status-quo equilibrium, there always exists an interior
equilibrium with a positive probability of change. For θ ≥ 1, there are threshold eﬀects since there
exists a range of parameters under which the status-quo is the only equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that when θ is low, there always exists an interior equilibrium. This
implies that there are no threshold eﬀects in leadership when θ is less than 1. In other words, over
the entire range of leadership ability l or τ, small changes in the leader’s ability or in any of the
underlying parameters result only in a small change in the probability of successful change. On
the other hand, when strategic complementarity is high i.e. for any θ ≥ 1, there exists thresholds
similar to condition (6) that must be satisﬁed for a leader to be eﬀective.
The underlying intuition for this diﬀerence stems again from the strategic complementarity
between committed followers, non-followers and the leader. When θ<1, slight increases in the
number of followers (at y =0 )results in a big increase in the participation of non-followers,
thus overall leading to a substantial increase in the mass of participants. Together this implies
that a small increase in followership also results in a signiﬁcant improvement to the leader’s
incentive in light of the expected change in overall participation. On the other hand when θ ≥ 1,
a marginal increase in y (at y =0 )results in only a small marginal increase in the overall number
of participants and thus is not enough to spur the leader into putting in more eﬀort. In this case
only a leader of suﬃciently high ability helps resolve the coordination failure by making successful
outcome to each individual’s investment much less dependent on the actions of others. Thus, when
θ ≥ 1, there exist threshold eﬀects in catalyzing change.
3.2 Leaders and Followers under Imperfectly Congruent Preferences
The analysis above was for a “benevolent” leader i.e. one whose preferences for change are perfectly
aligned with that of the majority. While this may be true in some instances, it need not always
be the case and the leader may have his or her own agenda for change separate from that desired
by the majority. We now explore this possibility.
When the leader’s interests are known to be aligned with a particular group, individuals in this
group do not have much reason to suspect his motives when he issues a call for action. However,
if the leader belongs to a diﬀerent class, ethnicity or religious group whose preferences for change
are divergent, the individual response may be rather diﬀerent. For instance, a Shiite leader’s call
22to arms with the aim of overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq may be viewed quite diﬀerently by
a Sunni than a Shiite. Accordingly, we now analyze the case where the leader may belong to or
have interests aligned with group E and thus his preferences for change may diverge from that of
the majority group M. In doing so, it also allows us to discuss in the same framework instances
of “good” as well as “bad” changes i.e. changes in which gains accrue to only a narrow minority
w h i l ea l lb e a rt h ec o s t .
We assume that the leader’s initial reputation of being benevolent i.e. having preferences
congruent with group M is given by λ ∈ (0,1). Recall that in state G0, only participants from
group E gain; those from group M gain nothing but incur the cost of participation c. The ex-ante
prior on the state being B is given by 1−α, w h i l et h a to ni tb e i n gG1 is αa a n do ni tb e i n gG0 is
α(1 − a). Ah i g h e ra implies a greater coincidence of objectives between the two groups and thus
also between a group E leader and the majority.
For a leader whose interests are aligned with group E we assume L1 > 0 as well as L0 > 0, so
that it is optimal for him to issue a call for action in state G1 as well as in G0.19,20 Thus upon
receiving a message from the leader, people in group M are no longer sure about its credibility,
and their updated probability about the state being G1 is given by:
Prob(G1|message)=b a =
a
a +( 1− λ)(1 − a)
As expected this is increasing in λ, the probability that the leader is of the benevolent type. While
all committed followers participate (as their cost of doing so is 0), among the non-followers only
those with low enough costs do so. This cutoﬀ cost c∗ is now given by:




As λ increases, b a increases, and this equation implies that as a result c∗ also rises. In other
words, an increase in λ raises credibility of the leader and thus results in greater participation by
the populace. Thus greater credibility raises the prospect of change by encouraging more mass
participation – this we call the “credibility eﬀect”.
However, our framework highlights that there is an additional aspect of a leader who does
n o tb e l o n gt og r o u pM. As pointed out above, if it was personally advantageous, such a leader
19Instead of group alignment, one could also think of state G1 as one in which change is personally beneﬁcial for
the leader (e.g. consolidates his hold on power) without bringing any widespread beneﬁts.
20While the leader’s message here has been assumed to only involve a call for action or not, enriching it in the
sense of allowing the leader to also declare the state of the world as G1 or G0 would not change the analysis. The
benevolent leader would declare the state truthfully while the self-interested leader would identify both states G1
and G0 as being G1. Thus the inference problem for the population would be the same as here.
23would be willing to be unscrupulous and would not hesitate to encourage the populace to make
an ineﬃcient investment in overturning the status quo. Somewhat unexpectedly, the political
ambitions of such a leader can have beneﬁcial consequences too. This willingness to leave no stone
unturned in order to acquire political power makes it more likely that such a leader may also (on
occasion) unearth a socially optimal window of opportunity for change (i.e. in state G1). To see
this, consider ﬁrst a benevolent leader. This leader calls for action and gains only in the state
G1; thus, taking the expected mass of participants me as given, a benevolent leader’s optimization
problem is given by: maxib αaibpmeL1 − e(ib) with the associated ﬁrst-order condition:
αapmeL1 = lib
For the politically ambitious leader the gains come about both in states G1 and G0 and thus the
ﬁrst-order condition characterizing his eﬀort is is given by:
αpme(aL1 +( 1− a)L0)=lis
C o m p a r i n gt h et w ow es e et h a tis =( 1+1−a
a
L0
L1)ib. The ambitious self-interested leader beneﬁts
politically from change in both states G0 and G1, with the unintended social beneﬁto f( p o t e n -
tially) also acquiring more information in state G1. This sets up the basic trade-oﬀ here: while
a benevolent leader is more credible and elicits wider mass participation in response to his mes-
sage (the ‘credibility eﬀect’) , a politically ambitious leader may acquire more information – the
‘ambition eﬀect’. We next examine how the two eﬀects compare.
For simplicity in exposition, we assume L0 = L1 = L, thus implying ib = ais. From an ex-ante
perspective, the probability of successful change occurring in state G1 (under a leader who is
benevolent with probability λ) is given by:
P1 = λibpme +( 1− λ)ispme =
αp2τ2L
l




where in equilibrium the expected mass of people participating is given by me = τ[y +(1−y) c∗
cH].
P1 encompasses the two above-mentioned eﬀects at work: as λ rises, the expected eﬀort put in
by the leader (proportional to λa +1− λ) falls, while due to increased credibility, participation
conditional on receiving a message, [y +( 1− y) c∗
cH], rises. The following proposition derives the
overall impact of λ on the probability of successful change in state G1.
Proposition 4 For b a< cH
3(1−y)pGτ,P 1 is decreasing in λ, while for b a> cH







Figure 4: Eﬀect of λ on the probability of change in state G1
The above proposition establishes that the leader’s type has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the
probability of bringing about change in the state G1 where everyone beneﬁts from it. For low
values of λ, the eﬀect of an increase in λ is to lower the probability of change, while beyond a
certain point, this eﬀect is positive. This is depicted in ﬁgure 4. The U-shaped relationship emerges
due to the trade-oﬀ between the “credibility” and “ambition” eﬀects. A greater alignment of the
leader’s preferences λ w i t ht h o s eo ft h ep o p u l a c eh a st w op o s s i b l ee ﬀects on P1.F i r s t ,a ni n c r e a s e
in λ has a positive impact on P1 due to the greater credibility of such a leader. At the same
time, it has a negative impact on the leader’s ‘ambition’ eﬀect. Which dominates? Note that
credibility is a more important factor in the participation decision of non-followers as they stand
to lose more by participating (mistakenly) in state G0. When λ is low, the leader’s credibility is
low and not many non-followers participate in any case. Thus in this case, the positive credibility
eﬀect due to an increased λ impacts only a small group. In contrast, due to the adverse impact on
the leader’s initiative, the same increase in λ has a negative eﬀect on followers and non-followers
alike. Therefore, when λ is small, the overall eﬀect of an increase in λ is to lower the probability
of change.21 The opposite holds for larger values of λ. In this case, there is bigger participation by
non-followers to begin with, and thus the positive credibility eﬀect is the dominant eﬀect at work.
The above analysis is of course contingent on a given level of followership y and shows that
a higher ex-ante probability of the leader being a benevolent type need not always translate into
a greater probability of change even in the state where everyone beneﬁts from it. The analysis
shows in a sharp way that a self-interested leader driven by ambition can be a strong force for
change. This idea resonates well with Caro’s (2002) sketch of Lyndon Johnson, where he argues
21It is also interesting to note the impact of an increase in the number of followers y on the turning point in the
above graph, i.e. λ = cH/[3(1−y)pGτ].A sy increases, this turning point increases. In other words, as the number
of followers rises, the eﬀect of increased λ is negative over a bigger range. The reason is that the leader’s credibility
is not a concern for followers since their participation cost is zero to begin with. For them, the main eﬀect is due to
the eﬀort put in by the leader. An increase in λ lowers eﬀort and thus reduces the possibility of change.
25that Johnson was eﬀective in pushing through the Voting Rights Act because there was a political
imperative for him to do so. According to Caro, Johnson’s relentless pursuit of the Presidency
propelled him to acquire information about the possibility (and the political beneﬁts) of pushing
through civil rights legislation. Indeed, Johnson worked very hard at persuading fellow senators
to follow his recommendation and vote for civil rights.
Endogenous Followership: We now consider the eﬀect of the leader’s type on followership and
consequently on the overall chances of change. Section 3.1 dealt with the case where the leader is
a benevolent type. For comparison, we now consider the diametric opposite case where the leader
is known to be of the self-interested type i.e. λ =0 .
In this case, b a = a and the marginal participant is given by: c∗ = apτ[y+(1−y) c∗
cH]G and the




To evaluate the value of followership for an individual from group M, one needs to calculate
the date T =2expected gains in states G0 and G1. In either state, provided the leader uncovers it
and one receives the leader’s message, one will participate if either one’s cost is 0 (which happens
with probability y) or it is below c∗. Thus in state Gx,x∈ {0,1}, the expected future gains are:







where Vx is the expected gain to participating in state Gx and is given by V =0in state G0 and
V = pτ[ye +( 1− ye) c∗
cH]G = c∗


















Compared with the case of a benevolent leader, there is an added incentive for followership here,
namely the alignment of one’s interests with those of the leader. This is important in the state G0;
being a follower participant in this state incurs zero loss as one’s cost of participation then is 0.
Being a non-follower participant however, one incurs the positive costs of participation c, without
getting any beneﬁt . I n v e s t i n gi nf o l l o w e r s h i pt h u sp r o v i des insulation by reducing the expected
loss in this situation. While we have cast followership in the model in terms of a lower cost of
participation, it could analogously be modeled as investing in higher gains from change. Again,
the incentive for a follower would be to align one’s interests more closely with those of the leader
(or his group) so as to reap greater gains under all circumstances. For example, this could be by
adopting a technology or an occupation that is closer in line with that of the elite group E so as
to achieve gains in both states G1 as well as G0.
26Weighing the marginal gain from increased investment in followership y against its marginal














The second term within square brackets on the left-hand side captures the added incentive to
become a follower here due to the insulation eﬀect of followership. As before, incorporating y from
















This expression is similar to the equilibrium condition for a benevolent leader (5). Thus the equi-
librium structure here is the same as before and again involves threshold eﬀects in the probability
of bringing about change. Since the model here endogenously develops a notion of eﬀective lead-
ership in terms of what is the threshold level of ability required to catalyze change, one can thus
c o m p a r et h el e v e lo fe ﬀectiveness of a benevolent versus a self-interested leader in terms of these
thresholds. The following proposition makes this comparison.
Proposition 5 If cH > 3
2pGτ, then for all a, the threshold level of ability l that is required for
a benevolent leader to be eﬀective is higher than that for a self-interested leader. If cH < 3
2pGτ,
then there exists a cutoﬀ level a∗ such that for a<a ∗, a benevolent leader needs to satisfy a higher
threshold ability level to demonstrate eﬀective leadership. In contrast, for a>a ∗, the threshold
ability level required for eﬀective leadership is higher for a self-interested ambitious leader.
Proof. See Appendix.
What kind of leader is more eﬀective at transforming the status-quo – a benevolent or an
ambitious one? In terms of the minimum ability level required for eﬀective leadership, the above
proposition highlights that the answer depends on the expected participation costs (given by cH/2)
and the degree of congruence between the two groups (given by a). The key to the intuition here
is that as discussed before, when the level of followers is high, a self-interested leader is more
likely to bring about change as compared to a benevolent one. The above proposition identiﬁes
two conditions under which individuals have a greater incentive to become followers. First, when
cH is high, the expected cost of participation ex-post is high, and therefore the desire to reduce
participation costs in the future provides a strong ex-ante incentive to invest in followership.
Second, when the relative probability of state G1 is low (i.e. a is small), an individual from group
M has a greater incentive to become a follower in order to insulate himself from the prospect of
adverse change. Under both these circumstances (i.e. a high cH and/or a low a), individuals’
27incentive to invest in followership is high. Thus in these cases, the threshold ability level required
for eﬀective leadership is lower for the self-interested leader.
Note that while the potential for eﬀective leadership is higher for a self-interested leader in
certain circumstances, such a leader is also more likely to enact change that is costly for all but
beneﬁts only a narrow minority. Thus a natural question is: for a given level of leader ability l,
what kind of leader is preferred by each group? In other words, in ex-ante welfare terms can it
be that a self-interested leader may be preferred by the majority to a benevolent one? This is
addressed in the next proposition. Of course, given multiple interior equilibria, in making welfare
comparisons, the choice of equilibria is important. In all cases, we consider the Pareto-dominant
one i.e. the one with the highest c∗.
Proposition 6 If cH > 3
2pGτ, the ex-ante welfare in the Pareto-dominant interior equilibrium (if
it exists) under a self-interested leader is higher than that under a benevolent leader of the same
ability. If cH < 3
2pGτ, then the above is true for small values of a.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that in terms of ex-ante welfare, there is a broad range of parameters
under which a self-interested leader would be preferred not only by the elite group E but also by
the majority M with whom it is known that the leader’s interests do not always coincide. Thus
even if one were to consider the issue of leader selection at the beginning of the game, it is possible
that the majority may wish to select a leader with objectives not always congruent with theirs.
The intuition for the above result can be understood by ﬁrst observing that for a given level of
participation c∗, a self-interested leader is always preferred by the populace. This is because such
a leader is viewed as more likely to acquire information about whether a window of opportunity
for change exists – the “ambition eﬀect”. So the issue is how does the leader’s preferences aﬀect
the overall level of participation c∗? There are two opposing considerations at work. First, a
self-interested leader’s lack of credibility tends to lower overall participation. On the other hand,
the desire to align interests means that an ambitious leader may have a larger number of followers
(the insulation eﬀect) – this tends to drive up c∗. As in proposition 5, the insulation eﬀect (and
thus followership) is likely to be strongest when the expected costs of participation (cH/2) is high
as well as when the relative probability of the good state, a, is low. In these cases, the insulation
eﬀect dominates the credibility eﬀect, and c∗ is high. In this case individuals prefer an ambitious
self-interested leader to a benevolent one from their own group.
The above proposition suggests why individuals may willingly choose to follow leaders such as
Hitler, Lenin or Mugabe. Our analysis shows that there are two reasons as to why individuals may
become members of the ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe, the Baath Party in Iraq or indeed even
28the Nazi party in Germany. The ﬁrst is the perception that (probabilistically) these ambitious
leaders can be eﬀective and are likely to catalyze a transition that may result in direct rewards for
all followers. However as discussed above, individuals also have an incentive to become followers
in order to insulate themselves against adverse change — the “insulation eﬀect”. This aspect of
followership is described (in the Nazi case) by Thyssen (1941), Brustein (1996) and Kater (1983)
and by Kravchenko (1947) (in the Soviet case), who document how (among other motivations)
prudent self-insurance was an additional consideration driving individuals to become members of
the Nazi (or Communist) party when Hitler (respectively, Stalin) came to power. Individuals may
become followers of leaders they know to be mendacious in an attempt to insulate themselves from
the adverse impact of any changes that may occur under the aegis of such leaders.
4 Leadership in Diﬀerent Environments: A Discussion
Political Institutions and the Scope of Leadership
Does the exercise of leadership diﬀer across the nature of political regimes? We address this
question by focusing on the fact that democratic political institutions help screen across leaders
in a way that is impossible in an autocracy. In particular, democratic elections ensure that the
leader’s preferences are (on average) likely to be closer to that of the majority. Here we discuss
the implications on the exercise of leadership of greater congruence of preferences between the
populace and the leader.
On one hand, an autocratic leader is much less institutionally constrained and can more easily
bring about certain kinds of changes through the issue of an edict or decree. However for an
autocrat, achieving the voluntary and enthusiastic participation of the populace to invest in reform
and large scale change is diﬃcult. In part, this is because such a leader is more likely to be perceived
as having preferences aligned with that of the elite or the ‘selectorate’ (see Besley and Kudamatsu,
2007) rather than with the masses. In terms of the present model, leaders in autocracies are more
likely to have preferences aligned to the elite (i.e. λ → 0) while leaders in democratic societies
are more likely to have preferences aligned with the majority (λ closer to 1). From Proposition 4,
for changes involving a high degree of congruence (i.e. a>a ∗), the ability threshold for eﬀective
leadership is stricter for a self-interested (i.e. λ =0 )leader. In other words, taking the same
ability distribution of leaders across diﬀerent political regimes, we are more likely to see changes
perceived as yielding all-round gains being attempted in democracies. In contrast, when there
is a low degree of congruence between the leader and the populace (i.e. for a<a ∗); changes
with a mismatch of interests between the majority and the elite have a greater likelihood of being
attempted in autocracies. Indeed this accords well with the contrasting experience of the type
29(and frequency) of economic reforms attempted in autocracies such as China and Singapore versus
those attempted (or not) in democratic India.
In terms of outcomes, majority aligned (λ =1 ) leaders only attempt changes in state G1
where it is in the majority’s (and elite’s) interest . On the other hand, elite-biased (λ =0 )l e a d e r s
attempt changes in both states G1 and G0. Note that in the latter state, even if the change is
successful, only the elite gain from it. Thus, given that autocracies are more likely to have leaders
with λ close to 0, this implies that there is likely to be greater variance in outcomes in autocracies
as against democracies. This accords well with the ﬁndings of Jones and Olken (2006) and Besley
and Kudamatsu (2007) that the variance in economic outcomes and institutional change is much
higher in autocracies than in well functioning democracies.
Media Freedom and the Exercise of Leadership:
The existence of media freedom is a distinctive aspect of modern democracies. Independent,
critical reporting is much more diﬃcult in countries where civil liberties are lacking and political
institutions tend to be autocratic. Here we discuss the implications of an independent and free
media on the exercise of leadership.
We introduce the idea of an independent and free press in a simple way. In particular, we
assume that there exists a separate agent, whom we call the ‘media’, who can independently
verify the leader’s call for action. Accordingly, we assume that if the leader calls for action in the
state G0, then with probability n the media learns of the true underlying state and reveals it to
the public. Thus, by constraining the leader’s attempts to pursue changes that beneﬁt only the
elite, the media here acts as a watchdog. For the discussion that follows, we assume that n>0 in
a democracy, while in an autocracy the media does not have a ‘watchdog’ role, i.e. n =0 .
Consider a leader with reputation λ. If this leader issues a call for action and is not contradicted
by the media, then people’s updated probability about the state being G1 is given by:
Prob(G1|msg., silent media)=b b a =
b a
b a +( 1− n)(1 − b a)
Observe that this expression is increasing in n. In other words, in the presence of an independent
media, a leader’s call for change has greater credibility with the population. Accordingly, the
cutoﬀ participation cost c∗ for non-followers is now given by: c∗ = b b apτ[y +( 1− y) c∗
cH]G. As n
increases, b b a increases, resulting in greater mass participation.
At the same time a free press constrains a self-interested ambitious leader’s incentive to call for
investment when the state is G0. Indeed, greater press freedom (high n) also lowers his incentive
to discover information about the underlying state.22 Thus an increase in press freedom (higher
22T h i sc a nb es e e nf r o mt h eﬁrst-order condition for the optimization problem now: lis = α[a+(1−a)(1−n)]pm
eL.
30n) sets up the basic trade-oﬀ here: while a freer media makes the leader more credible (similar to
the “credibility eﬀect” before) and elicits more response to his message, it lowers initiative put in
by a self-interested leader (the “ambition eﬀect”). In comparison, a benevolent leader’s eﬀort is
given by: ib = a
a+(1−a)(1−n)is. Thus as n approaches 1, both benevolent and self-interested leaders’
actions become similar. Therefore, a democracy with an independent media constrains leaders.
We now examine the impact of greater press freedom, on the ability of the leader to bring
about change. The probability of change in the ‘ good’ state G1 for a given mass of followers is:
P1 =[ λib +( 1− λ)is]pme = α
L
G2l





This expression captures the two eﬀects at work due to increased media vigilance. The negative
‘ambition eﬀect’ is captured by term in the curly brackets while the credibility eﬀect that increases





.F o rr e g i m e sw i t ha na l r e a d yr e a s onably independent media (i.e.
ah i g hn), a further increase in independence can only improve the prospects for change. In
contrast, in a regime with poorly functioning media, the eﬀect is reversed. However, the media
also constrains the possibility of (harmful) change in the state G0. Here in addition to the above
two eﬀects, there is the direct vigilance eﬀect of a more active media. This probability is given
by P0 =( 1− n)(1 − λ)ispme. An increase in n now has the additional direct eﬀect of lowering P0
through the term (1 − n). Thus the positive participation eﬀect of an increased n can be much
dampened by this direct vigilance eﬀect and may serve to overall lower the probability of such
harmful change occurring.
Greater press freedom usually accompanies democratization of political institutions. How-
ever, our analysis suggests that the relationship between greater press freedom and the leader’s
eﬀectiveness at catalyzing change is not straightforward. In particular, we demonstrate that the
relationship is non-monotonic, with a more independent media improving the possibility of change,
but only if it was moderately independent to begin with.
5 Leadership and Change: Examples in Three Contexts
In this section we describe a few examples in a variety of contexts which illustrate some of the
key elements of our framework. Namely, (a) the leader’s ability to rally and coordinate individual
investment decisions through the identiﬁcation of suitable windows of opportunity as well as
eﬀective communication, and (b) the feedback relationship between leadership and followership:
a leader with a high reputation attracts followers, who in turn make the leader more eﬀective.
31Social and Environmental Reform Movements
Our framework applies to the role of leaders in catalyzing social change of various kinds, from the
elimination of racial, gender and caste discrimination, the temperance movement, the campaign to
ban child labor and also to environmental movements.23 We now describe in some detail Gandhi’s
a t t e m p ta ts o c i a lc h a n g e .
Gandhi and Untouchability in the Indian Caste System. One of the longest surviving social insti-
tutions found anywhere is that of the caste system in India. A particularly pernicious aspect of the
system is the practice of ‘untouchability’. Some individuals are designated as ‘untouchables’ and
all others are prohibited from social interaction with these ‘untouchables’ who are only allowed
to hold scavenging jobs. Social interaction is strongly governed by the caste code, where any one
who interacts with an ‘untouchable’ becomes a social outcaste and untouchable himself.
Gandhi had strong convictions and viewed the elimination of untouchability as a very important
issue early on. While in his personal life he embraced untouchables, Gandhi realized that education
and his personal example alone was not going to be suﬃcient to transform the age-old social
institution. Gandhi’s decision to spend most of his time living in and interacting with village India
gave him prolonged exposure and a much better understanding of the pulse of the country, local
traditions and the issues they felt strongly about. Gandhi’s decades in village India correspond to
a high investment i in our model. Accordingly, Gandhi was patient and waited for the apposite
window of opportunity to appear. During this time, through his struggle against the British and
his ﬁght against landlords and other social evils, Gandhi’s reputation increased as did the number
of his committed followers in and outside the Congress Party (a higher y).
When the British proposed to have separate electorates for the untouchables, Gandhi imme-
diately perceived that this was the right moment to strike (i.e. a state corresponding to G1)
– since not only did he now have a large number of committed followers, but also because he
could obtain broad support by fusing a ﬁght against untouchability with a ﬁght against British
rule. Gandhi also showed his communication ability τ, since he was aware that the best way
for him to communicate the intensity of his feelings was through going on a fast unto death in
protest against both British rule and untouchability. According to Willmer (1984) this resulted in
“......events that astounded all who knew of the almost automatic loathing and fear felt by caste
Hindus at the very thought of being touched by or in close proximity to an Untouchable....... Even
more astonishing was the public fraternization of Hindus with Untouchables. In the streets of the
23For instance, the success of the ‘tree woman’ Wangari Maathai and her Green Belt movement in Kenya owed
much to her ability to mobilize thousands of women followers. Similarly, the success of the Chipko Andolan (Hug
the Trees) movement to prevent deforestation of the Indian Himalayas was attributable to the ability of its two
leaders, S. Bahuguna and C.P. Bhatt, and the large number of committed followers.
32cities, high caste Hindus were seen eating together with the cobblers, street cleaners, sweepers and
scavengers......Gandhi had produced a miracle. The long tradition of acceptance and approval of
untouchability was shattered and the basis was laid for its ultimate disappearance.”
In an era where there was almost no mass media such as radio and television and most of
the population was illiterate, this quick mobilization of support for eliminating untouchability
was partly possible due to Gandhi’s seizing of the right moment and partly due to the legion of
committed followers that Gandhi had (Amin, 1984). The above episode dramatically illustrates
the symbiotic relationship between Gandhi and his followers that made him so eﬀective.
Political Transitions
Leaders have often been crucial to catalyzing changes in political institutions. Examples range
from Lenin’s role in the October revolution, to Lech Walensa in leading the Solidarity movement
to overthrow the status-quo in Poland or legislative and constitutional changes that expanded
the scope of voting rights (as in South Africa and the United States). Here we illustrate the
applicability of our framework using one of the best documented cases of institutional change
within a well-functioning democracy.
Lyndon Johnson and the Voting Rights Act.24 For eighty two years prior to 1957 no civil rights bill
for blacks had successfully managed to pass through the United States Senate due to opposition
by a bloc of Southern senators. Despite many attempts, there seemed to be no common ground
between the pro and anti civil rights forces and “the chasm between the two sides was unbridgeable”
(Caro 2002, p. 948).
To being with, by this time Lyndon Johnson (LBJ) had already built up reputation as a
powerful Majority leader of the Senate. As Caro documents (pp. 562-65), Johnson had the
committed support of the “Big Bulls” of the Democratic Party in addition to his sizable “ﬁrst
team” of followers in the Senate.25 The loyalty that he commanded made Johnson a formidable
force. However, having a large base of followers y was not enough — he needed a window of
opportunity. Motivated doubtless by his presidential ambitions, LBJ spent an enormous amount
of time (high i) and resources trying to ﬁgure out the requirements, weaknesses and strengths
of all parties necessary to the striking of a deal. LBJ’s leadership skill lay in being the ﬁrst
to ‘discover’ a window of opportunity for an agreement in the form of a mutually advantageous
24For most of what follows we extensively draw on Robert Caro’s (2002) masterly biography of Lyndon Johnson;
all page citations refer to that book.
25Individuals who were not on LBJ’s ‘ﬁrst team’ of committed supporters, found that the price of getting in his
good books was an explicit price in the form of favors to be done, before they could expect any beneﬁts. (see Caro’s
discussion on ‘The Johnson Rule’). This corresponds directly with the up-front cost y that an individual invests in
in order to become a follower in our model.
33deal between two key factions in the Senate: the Southern Senators who cared about civil rights
legislation and the senators from the mountain states who wanted a hydro-electric project at Hells
Canyon. According to Caro, Johnson was skilled enough to see “a potential connection between
the two realities. No one else had seen it. During the ten years that Hells Canyon had been before
Congress, there had not been the slightest link between the dam and civil rights”. As a result
of his skill (small l), and high investment i in identifying a ‘window of opportunity’ and aided
by his sizable ‘ﬁrst team’ of followers (high y), Johnson made history. He managed to persuade
enough senators on both sides to compromise, such that on August 7, 1957 the path-breaking
Voting Rights bill was ﬁnally approved. It was hailed by the New York Times as “incomparably
the most signiﬁcant domestic action of any Congress in the twentieth century.”
Economic Reform and Organizational Transformation
Our framework also applies to the role that individual leaders have had in catalyzing changes in the
economic sphere, be it within the context of a ﬁrm or economy-wide. Although incentive contracts
are common in ﬁrms, there is also a voluntary component to the relationship between the CEO and
his employees. As Kotter (2002) emphasizes, these non-contractible aspects of employee decision
making assume particular importance during attempts to implement changes in the organizational
philosophy and outlook. A classic example is Jack Welch’s role at General Electric (GE). He took a
key role in catalyzing organizational transformation by facilitating coordinated (costly) investment
by the ﬁrm’s employees — from retraining, acceptance of new management practices to buying into
a new organizational philosophy. When he took over as CEO of GE, Welch was quick to put
his followers (called his “varsity team”) into 12 of the 14 key managerial positions. According to
Barlett and Wozny (2005), all of these managers had invested in and agreed with Welch’s “strong
commitment to the new management values and a willingness to break with the old GE culture.”
With his followers in position, Welch further showed his ability to identify shifts and emerging
opportunities from anticipating globalization of business in the eighties to adopting e-business
before others did. Together, these played a signiﬁcant part in revitalizing GE.
At the economy-wide level, implementing reform requires a combination of spotting appropriate
‘windows of opportunity’ as well as the persuasion of ﬁrms, unions, workers and other groups to
invest in the reform. Examples range from the initiation of reform by Carlos Lleras Restrepo in
Colombia and Narasimha Rao in India to Bill Clinton persuading various interest groups to sign
onto NAFTA. In each of these instances, the set of technologically productive ﬁrms, trained workers
and other groups who are well prepared for global integration constitute the set of committed
followers. If circumstances look propitious and support for reform is large enough then enough
others (the non-follower participants in our model) may also be persuaded to join the process of
34reform. The following episode illustrates one such instance of persuasion by a leader.
Resuscitating Economic Reform: Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour. In the early nineties, the future
of economic reform in post-Tiananmen China was seriously in doubt. The collapse of the Soviet
Union had strengthened the hands of Chen Yun and the leftist ideologues at the expense of Deng
and the reformers. Both in the media as well as within the party there was a concerted attempt
to discredit Deng’s policies of reform. Deng realized that winning the political (and ideological)
debate within the higher echelons of the party was diﬃcult and that he would need to mobilize
support for reforms by directly addressing his followers. He further recognized that communication
with the people was particularly diﬃcult in Beijing due to the tight party control over the media.
Accordingly, Deng undertook the unprecedented ‘Southern Tour’ when he travelled to the
Southern provinces in general and Guangdong and Shanghai in particular (Ash and Kueh, 1996).
Deng’s leadership ability showed in his quick identiﬁcation of the diﬃculties of trying to garner
support in Beijing. As pointed out by Zhao (1993), while Deng’s skill in choosing both the right
time and place to take on the central party hierarchy was important, success would not have
been possible were it not for his conﬁdence in the support of his followers in these regions — the
direct beneﬁciaries of the reforms. Deng emphasized the importance of broad based economic
development and reform to communicate with his followers and the lower level hierarchy in the
party, using it as a way to criticize (and isolate) the ideological hardliners (Naughton, 1993). The
response to Deng’s appeal by both his followers and non-followers was immediate. It mobilized
opinion and put pressure on the party hierarchy; thousands of cables and letters poured into Beijing
party headquarters expressing support for Deng’s policies. Not surprisingly, Deng’s Southern Tour
is widely regarded as single-handedly shifting the political momentum decisively and irreversibly
in favor of the continuation of economic reform in China.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Leaders are ubiquitous across societies and organizations and have often been central to the trans-
formation of organizations, political institutions and in many instances of social and economic
reform. In this paper we took a ﬁrst step towards analyzing the role of leadership in catalyzing
large-scale change. Our analysis emphasizes that in order to understand eﬀective leadership, it is
important to focus on the nature of the relationship between a leader and his followers in trans-
forming the prospects for change. The two-way interaction between followership and the supply
of leadership initiative can endogenously give rise to threshold eﬀects, with slight diﬀerences in
the underlying structural conditions or in the leaders’s ability resulting in dramatic diﬀerences
in the prospects for change. Further the model shows that under a broad set of conditions, the
35populace may deliberately prefer to follow an ambitious leader whose interests may not always be
congruent with theirs. As a result, while such leaders are more likely to bring about change, this
change may often not be in the best interests of the majority. Thus our analysis also throws light
on why ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ leaders may both have their followers.
However our analysis is but a ﬁrst step. Our framework explored only the broad contours of
the impact of leaders in encouraging followership and participation to bring about change. Several
other important elements of the process are obvious directions for future study. For instance,
while the mode of change (captured by parameters such as the uncertainty of the process p,
the gains G and the costs to change c) is taken as given in our model, an important aspect of
leadership is perhaps in choosing the right instrument for change. For example, in the context
of political change, violent insurgency, peaceful demonstrations or strategic propaganda could be
several possible means to achieve the same end. The leader’s role would then be to determine
which of these instruments would be the most appropriate under the given circumstances. A
second aspect of leadership which has not been studied explicitly in our model (except in the
welfare comparisons for diﬀerent types of leaders) is leader selection. For example, if there were
diﬀerent individuals espousing diﬀerent paths to change, who gets selected as the leader and
how does this depend on the underlying environment? Or if there are multiple leaders, what is
the dynamics of followership across the leaders and what is the impact on the overall chances for
change? Aspects of the leader-follower relationship also deserve to be explored further. As pointed
out by Levi (2006), ‘leaders have the power to misinform and to manipulate, but they also have
the power to inspire change’. In this context it would be useful to analyze in more detail the
psychological and emotional underpinnings of the leader-follower relationship.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium level of participation, c∗
Zhao Suisheng (1993), “Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour” Asian Survey. Vol. 33(8), pp. 739-56.
Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s t i o n1 :Consider equation (1) for a given level of y>0.A tc∗ =0 , the LHS
is less than the RHS as y>0. At c∗ = cH, the RHS = pτG < cH = LHS (by assumption 1).
Both sides of the equation are linear in c∗ (and are as depicted in ﬁgure 2); thus there is a unique
solution to the equation in the range c∗ ∈ [0,c H].
The probability of successful change in state G1 is given by:pτme = pτ[y +( 1− y) c∗
cH]=c∗
G.
The two sides of equation (1) are depicted in ﬁgure 5. Increases in y, p, G or τ or a decrease in cH
raise the RHS of (1) but have no eﬀect on the LHS, and thus from the ﬁgure, result in an increase
in c∗. Hence, these changes in the underlying parameters raise the probability of successful change
in state G1.
Derivation of the overall equilibrium:
Incorporating (from (2)) i = αapτ[y +( 1− y) c∗
cH]L1/l = αaL1
lG c∗ into (4) characterizes for a







Given that the population is a continuum, if each individual invests y in followership, then y is
also the fraction of the population with realized cost of participation c =0i.e. it is the fraction of
committed followers. For a given level of followership y, the degree of participation by the general
populace is given by the equilibrium condition (1):
pτ[y +( 1− y)
c∗
cH


























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Consider equation (5). Clearly c∗ =0is a solution. Eliminating a
c∗ from both sides, we see that while the RHS is independent of c∗, the LHS has three roots, at
c∗ =0 ,c H and 2cH. In the relevant range i.e. between c∗ =0and c∗ = cH, it is inverse U-shaped.
Thus, as depicted in ﬁgure 2(b), there will be either two solutions to equation (5) (case 1 in the
ﬁgure) or none (case 2 in the ﬁgure, in which case there is no interior equilibrium, and the only
equilibrium involves c∗ =0 ,y=0and i =0 ) .
Which case occurs thus depends on whether or not the RHS is greater or less than the highest
point of the LHS. In the range c∗ ∈ [0,c H], the maximum of the LHS occurs at c∗ = cH(1− 1 √
3),




3lGk . Whether or not this exceeds the RHS is given by (6).
Derivation of Equilibrium for a general θ:
Again starting from period 2, the cutoﬀ cost for the marginal non-follower is given by equating








Under assumption 20, (15) always has a unique interior solution for any y>0.
In period 1, the leader’s problem of how much to invest in acquiring information about the
appropriateness of the current situation is almost identical to that before, and is characterized by
the ﬁrst-order condition:
αapτ
θ [y +( 1− y) c∗
cH]θL1 = li or using (15), i = αaL1c∗/(Gl).
Finally, the period 0 problem of deciding on followership is identical to the previous analysis,
and thus the optimal choice of y is again given by:αaiτ[c∗ −
(c∗)2
2cH ]=ky.
As before, using y from (15) and i = αaL1c∗/(Gl), we can rearrange the above ﬁrst-order






















26Equation (5) characterizes the overall equilibrium in the case where the elite group is of zero mass. Suppose
instead the elite had a small but positive mass given by ne, while that for the majority is nm =1− ne. It can be






























which is very similar in its properties as equation (5). Thus, the threshold eﬀect holds here too.
40Solutions to this equation (if any) characterize equilibria for the overall game here.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 :Clearly c∗ =0is a solution to (7) and is an equilibrium here too. To
look for interior equilibria, we eliminate a c∗ from both sides of (7). The LHS now is the same as
that of (5) and thus between c∗ =0and c∗ = cH, it is inverse U-shaped (as in ﬁgure 2(b)).
The RHS however is diﬀerent and depends on θ. For θ<1, 1







cH is increasing in c∗. At c∗ =0 ,R H S= − 1





θ −1) > 0=LHS (by assumption 20). Thus there is always at least one interior
solution to (7). In other words, for 0 <θ<1, in addition to the no-action equilibrium, there
always exists an interior equilibrium with a positive probability of change.
For θ>1, 1
θ − 1 < 0 and hence the RHS is decreasing in c∗. Note that the LHS is inverse
U-shaped and attains its maximum value at c∗ = cH(1 − 1 √


















θ − 1), there will be no interior solution for the equilibrium
condition (7) which implies that in this case the only equilibrium is the no-action one.









Denote f(b a)=b a[ 1
pτG −
(1−y)e a
cH ]2; we ﬁnd that f0(b a) ≷ 0 according as cH
3(1−y)pτG ≷ b a. Since P1 is
inversely related to f(b a), and b a is increasing in λ, this establishes the result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :Eliminating a c∗, the LHS of both (5) and (12) can be written as
α2Lτ
lGk c∗(1 − c∗
cH)(1 − c∗
2cH), implying that it is inverse U-shaped, as in Figure 2(b).
The RHS of (5) is then ( 1
pGτ − 1
cH)/a2, while that for (12) is 1
pGτ − a
cH. Comparing the two,
the RHS of (5) is bigger or less than the RHS of (12) according as cH ≷ pGτ(1 + a2
1+a).
Now a2
1+a is increasing in a, and has a maximum value of 1/2. Thus, if cH > 3
2pGτ, then the
RHS of (5) is always bigger than the RHS of (12) and therefore the threshold for a benevolent
leader is more stringent.
On the other hand, if cH < 3
2pGτ, there exists an a∗ ∈ (0,1) at which cH = pGτ(1 +
(a∗)2
1+a∗).
Below a∗,c H >p G τ(1 + a2
1+a) i.e. the RHS of (5) is bigger than the RHS of (12), meaning that
the threshold for a benevolent leader is more stringent. For a>a ∗, the reverse holds and the
threshold is more stringent for a self-interested leader.
41P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :To derive the ex-ante welfare WB under a benevolent leader, we
take the period 0 payoﬀ from (3) and plug back the optimal y from (4) together with the leader’s
equilibrium choice iB = αaL1















Similarly the ex-ante welfare WS under a self-interested leader is derived by plugging in the

















Note that for a given c∗,W B <W S for all a<1 and as expected are equal for a =1 . Also
note that WB and WS are both increasing in c∗; thus, if c∗ under a self-interested leader is bigger
than that under a benevolent leader, WS will exceed WB.


































The left-hand side of both are identical and represent an inverse U-shaped function of c∗ as
depicted in ﬁgure 2. The right hand side of both are constant and whether the Pareto-dominant






cH i.e. if cH >p G τ(1 + a2
1+a).
If cH > 3
2pGτ, then this holds for all a ∈ [0,1], while if cH < 3
2pGτ, it holds for a small enough.
Thus in either of these two cases, the (Pareto-dominant) equilibrium c∗ under a self-interested
leader is higher than that under a benevolent leader, and consequently the ex-ante welfare under
a self-interested leader WS is greater than that under a benevolent leader WB.
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